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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No, 890729-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT A. DYER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a guilty plea to three counts of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 
two of which are second degree felonies and one of which is a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1990); and one count of unlawful possession of 
marijuana without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. SS 59-19-105 and 59-19-106 (Supp. 
1989). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), as the appeal is 
from a district court in a criminal case not involving a 
conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the notice of appeal in this case was filed 
in a timely manner, giving this Court jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. 
2. Whether defendant entered a conditional guilty plea 
to properly preserve the suppression issue for appeal. 
3. Whether the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant in this matter was sufficient to establish probable 
cause. 
4. Whether the magistrate who issued the search 
warrant independently found that the affidavit established 
probable cause. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 1, 1989, a search warrant was obtained and 
served on th€> residence of defendant (Record of case no. 6380 
[hereinafter R.] at 9-20, copies of the search warrant and 
affidavit are attached to this brief as Addendum A and Addendum 
B). Based on the evidence seized during that search, defendant 
was charged on February 3, 1989 with one count of distribution of 
a controlled substance, a second degree felony; one count of 
arranging for distribution of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony; three counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, two of which are second 
degree felonies and one of which is a third degree felony; three 
counts of unlawful possession of controlled substances without 
tax stamps affixed, all third degree felonies; one count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony; and one count of 
failure to stop at the command of a police officer, a third 
degree felony (Record of case no. 6378 at 9, and R. at 30-32). 
-2-
The record does not contain a written motion to 
suppress the evidence. The trial court conducted a suppression 
hearing on August 24, 1989 (R. at 38 and transcript of hearing 
which is contained, but unnumbered, in the record on appeal). No 
evidence was taken at that hearing, both parties relying on 
argument and on the preliminary hearing transcript, a portion of 
which is found in the file for case no. 6378. On August 28, 
1989, both the State and defendant filed memoranda in support of 
their positions on the motion to suppress (R. at 39-45 and 46-
56). On August 28, 1989, the court entered its written ruling, 
denying the motion (R. at 57-63; a copy of the ruling is attached 
as Addendum C). 
Also, on August 24, 1989, before the ruling on the 
motion to suppress, defendant entered into a plea agreement. On 
that date he pled guilty in the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page, District Judge, presiding. Defendant pled guilty to four 
of the counts against him in case no. 6380. In return, the 
remaining counts of 6380 and the single count in case no. 6378 
were dismissed (R. at 65). Nothing in the record indicates that 
the pleas were entered conditionally. 
On October 24, 1989, defendant was sentenced to a 
prison term of one to fifteen years for the second degree felony 
charges, and zero to five years on the third degree felony 
charge. He was not ordered to pay a fine. He was ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $4,361.82 to the Bountiful Police 
Department, and $588.25 to the Layton Police Department. The 
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sentences were to run concurrently (R. at 82). On October 27, 
1989, defendant filed a motion for a certificate of probable 
cause, which the State did not oppose and which the court granted 
(R. at 71-73). 
On December 7, 1989, an order to show cause was issued 
for defendant for violation of the terms of his release (R. at 
83-85). The record does not indicate whether any action was 
taken on the order. On December 20, 1989, a notice of appeal, 
purportedly signed October 24, 1989, was filed with the trial 
court (R. at 91). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The record of this case contains little in the way of 
testimony. The file for case no. 6378 contains a partial 
transcript of the preliminary hearing (Record of case no. 6378 at 
17). That transcript deals primarily with the time of the 
execution of the search warrant, the location of substances found 
in defendant's residence, the questioning of defendant, and the 
arguments of counsel at the preliminary hearing. The transcript 
does not contain anything that addresses the issues raised by 
defendant on appeal. 
The transcript of the suppression hearing likewise does 
not contain any testimony. It contains the arguments of counsel 
on the issue of suppression with minor citations to a preliminary 
hearing transcript which is not contained in the record on 
appeal. 
The only evidence of a factual nature in the record is 
the search warrant and affidavit in support thereof (R. at 14-15 
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and 16-20; Addendum A and Addendum B). The affidavit indicates 
that the affiant, Lon F. Brian, had received information from 
another officer that a confidential informant had told the other 
officer that the informant had purchased an ounce of cocaine from 
defendant approximately two weeks prior to the writing of the 
affidavit. The informant had observed approximately nine ounces 
of cocaine at defendant's residence at the time of his purchase 
(R. at 17). Officer Brian also wrote that he had received 
information from four other people in the past that defendant was 
trafficking in drugs (R. at 17). One of those four persons had 
been in defendant's residence on January 23, 1989, and had seen 
drug paraphernalia and marijuana at the home (R. at 17). 
Defendant had told this second informant that defendant was 
getting more marijuana in a few days (R. at 17-18). 
A third informant had told Officer Brian in November of 
1987 that defendant had sold pound quantities of controlled 
substances to the third informant (R. at 18). On February 1, 
1989, Officer Brian had been present during a communication 
between a fourth informant and defendant during which defendant 
had agreed to sell one ounce of cocaine to the fourth informant 
(R. at 18). Initial contact between this fourth informant and 
defendant had been by telephone to defendant's residence (R. at 
18). Officers observed the meeting between this informant and 
defendant and pursued defendant in his vehicle. During the 
pursuit, the officers saw defendant throw baggies from his 
vehicle. When the vehicle was stopped after a high speed chase, 
the informant told officers that the baggies contained cocaine 
(R. at 18). 
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The informant who had been in defendant's house on 
January 23, 1989 was considered trustworthy because he had 
provided information to officers in the past which had resulted 
in the conviction of over 20 people (R. at 18). Officer Brian 
affirmed that his experience and training as a drug enforcement 
officer revealed that drug dealers often kept records of their 
dealings (R. at 18-19). He also indicated that drug dealers 
often kept paraphernalia for the use and distribution of 
controlled substances (R. at 19). Based on the ease with which 
controlled substances can be destroyed, Officer Brian asked for a 
warrant to be served night or day, without previous notice to any 
occupants (R. at 19). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The record in this matter reveals that defendant was 
sentenced on October 27, 1989. His notice of appeal was not 
filed until December 20, 1989, well past the time for filing an 
appeal. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant sought 
for or received an extension of the time for filing; neither were 
there any motions which would have tolled the running of the 
time. 
Defendant pled guilty to four counts in this matter. 
The record indicates only that he pled guilty; it does not show 
that the plea was conditional. An unsigned minute entry says 
only that defendant pled guilty and the court accepted the plea. 
If this Court reaches the merits of defendant's 
arguments on appeal, the record demonstrates that the affidavit 
supports the trial court's finding that the search warrant was 
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issued on a showing of probable cause. The affidavit must show 
only a probability that the controlled substances would be found 
at defendant's residence; the affiant does not have to show 
certain knowledge. The information in the affidavit was not too 
stale. Indeed, the length of time indicated by the different 
reports which came to officers revealed only that defendant's 
involvement was long term and ongoing. The information was shown 
to be trustworthy by the use of reliable informants and the 
intertwining of the information. 
Because the affidavit supported a finding of probable 
cause, the magistrate who signed the search warrant acted in a 
neutral and detached fashion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT FILED 
UNTIL FIFTY-FIVE DAYS AFTER HE WAS SENTENCED; 
CONSEQUENTLY, HIS APPEAL IS UNTIMELY AND 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Defendant was sentenced on October 24, 1989 (R. at 74-
75 and 82). On October 27, 1989, defendant's application for a 
certificate of probable cause was granted (R. at 73). 
Defendant's notice of appeal was not filed with the district 
court until December 20, 1989, although it carries the signature 
date of October 24, 1989 (R. at 91). A letter from Mr. Yengich's 
secretary indicates that the notice was a duplicate "of the 
Robert Dyer appeal papers" (R. at 90). Nothing in the file 
indicates an earlier filing of the notice; nor is there any 
motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
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Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
mandates that "the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from" (emphasis added). This Court had occasion to 
explain this rule in In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). In that case, this Court said: 
In determining whether a notice of appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in 
an appellate court, this court must be bound 
by the filing date indicated on the notice of 
appeal transmitted to it by the trial court. 
This requirement is implicit in provisions of 
our rules governing timeliness of an appeal. 
781 P.2d at 1288 (emphasis added). In that case, the juvenile 
asked this Court to presume from the procedure by which the case 
had arrived at this Court that the lower court had determined 
that the notice was timely. This Court said: 
If the procedures for initiating an appeal 
set forth in our rules are to have any 
practical significance, a determination of 
timeliness cannot be presumed or inferred 
from actions of the trial court. 
[I]f transmittal of the letter [from the 
juvenile's counsel explaining why the notice 
had gone first to the district court and was 
thus late to the juvenile court] was intended 
as an indication to this court that the trial 
court determined the appeal to have been 
timely received, that determination should be 
specifically indicated by an order of the 
trial court or by the date of filing stamped 
on the notice of appeal. 
781 P.2d at 1289. 
In the present case, the notice of appeal is stamped as 
filed on December 20, 1989, some fifty-five days after 
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defendant's sentencing. The letter from Mr. Yengich's secretary 
implies that the originals were sent to the district court 
earlier. This Court cannot infer that that is correct or that 
the trial court has deemed the December 20th filing to be timely. 
This appeal should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, or, at 
most, remanded to the district court for a determination of 
timeliness, as was done in M.S. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION 
THAT DEFENDANT PRESERVED THE SUPPRESSION 
ISSUE FOR APPEAL BY FILING A CONDITIONAL 
GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant states that he entered a conditional guilty 
plea to four of the charges against him (Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 5). Nothing in the record supports 
the claim that a conditional plea was entered pursuant to State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). As with the 
case of State v. Bobo, No. 890606-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 19, 
1990), the record contains only an unsigned minute entry which 
reads: 
This is the time set for Change of Plea. 
The defendant is present and is represented 
by Ron Yengich. William McGuire is present 
on behalf of the State of Utah. 
Court explains rights. Defendant will 
plead guilty to Counts 2, 3, 4 & 7 of Case 
#6380. Pursuant to a negotiation the other 
counts will be dismissed along with Case 
#6378. 
Defendant pleads guilty. Court finds that 
he has done so knowingly and intelligently 
and the facts support the plea. Defendant is 
referred to AP&P for pre-sentence 
investigation and sentence is set for October 
3, 1989. 
Defendant will remain on bail. 
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(R. at 65). Two months later, the trial court signed a 
certificate of probable cause (R. at 71). The minute entry for 
the sentencing hearing reads, in pertinent part: 
Court finds that there is a viable issue 
for appeal. State does not object to a 
Certificate of Probable Cause. 
(R. at 73). The procedure in this case follows almost exactly 
the one rejected in Bobo. As in that case, the record before 
this Court is wholly inadequate to establish that defendant's 
guilty plea was conditional. Bobo, slip op. at 2. 
Rules 11 and 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals place? the burden on the appellant to provide an adequate 
record on appeal. This Court should not consider allegations 
that are based on matters outside the record on appeal. As the 
Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 
1986): 
If an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, this Court must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below. State 
v. Robbins, Utah, 709 P.2d 771 (1985); State 
v. Jones, Utah 657 P.2d 1263 (1982). 
718 P.2d at 405. The record in the present case states that 
The State recognizes that this Court in footnote one of Bobo 
seemed to place an obligation on the State to determine, off the 
record, whether the State and the trial court had consented to a 
conditional plea. This has never been the State's obligation. 
As noted in the body of this brief above, the obligation has 
always been on the appellant to provide an adequate record to 
support his or her claims. It has always been improper for the 
parties to argue matters not contained in the record. E.g. State 
v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297, (Utah 1986). 
In the present case, it is the obligation of defendant to 
provide a transcript of the change of plea hearing or some other 
documentation upon which this Court can determine whether the 
plea was indeed conditional. 
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defendant pled guilty and the court accepted that plea as knowing 
and voluntary and supported by the facts of the case. This Court 
must assume the regularity of that finding. An assumption that 
the guilty plea was conditional is not supported by the record. 
Therefore, the suppression issue is not properly before this 
Court. Bobo, slip op. at 3. 
POINT III 
IF THE COURT REACHES THE MERITS OF 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL, THE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT IN 
THIS CASE PROVIDED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR THE MAGISTRATE TO ISSUE THE WARRANT. 
Based upon the State's arguments in the preceding 
points, this Court should not address the merits of defendant's 
claim that the evidence seized should have been suppressed 
because the issuance of the search warrant was not supported by 
probable cause. However, if the Court decides to address that 
claim, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion 
to suppress. 
Defendant contends that the affidavit for the search 
warrant issued for his residence lacked any indicia of probable 
cause and therefore the warrant was issued in violation of his 
fourth amendment rights. More specifically, defendant argues 
that there was no information to show that any of the evidence 
seized would be located in his residence (Br. of App. at 8). 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant raised this issue in a suppression hearing 
before the trial court, and the court concluded: 
[F]rom all of the information set forth in 
the affidavit taken from a common sense point 
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of view there was a fair probability that 
defendant resided in the residence in 
question and that controlled substance, 
paraphernalia, and records of drug 
trafficking would be found therein. 
Even assuming for the purposes of argument 
that the affidavit in question was inadequate 
to support the warrant, the court concludes 
that evidence obtained in the case would be 
admitted under the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule as set forth in U.S. v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
(R. at 60-61 and included as Addendum C). To overturn this 
ruling, this Court must find that the trial court's factual 
evaluation underlying its decision to deny defendant's motion to 
suppress was clearly erroneous. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This Court addressed the standard 
of review in State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989): 
When a search warrant is subsequently 
challenged on the grounds that it was issued 
without the requisite probable cause . . . 
"the fourth amendment does not require that 
the reviewing court conduct a de novo review 
of the magistrate's probable cause 
determination." [State v.] Babbell, 770 P.2d 
[987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the 
determination is "whether the magistrate had 
a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of circumstances, the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
Moreover, in making this determination, the 
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's 
decision "great deference." ^d. (quoting 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, []). 
Our role in reviewing that determination is 
limited: "Because a trial court is in an 
advantageous position to assess witness 
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual 
assessment underlying a decision to . . . 
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly 
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appears that the lower court was in error. "• 
[State v.1 Droneberq, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)] 
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when 
the trial court's factual assessment is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or 
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. 
783 P.2d at 57. The record in the present case supports the 
finding of the trial court. Since the court's ruling upholding 
the search warrant is not clearly erroneous, this Court should 
defer to the trial court's determination. 
B. PROBABLE CAUSE 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation" prior to issuance of a search warrant. State v. 
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
2 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, probability, not conclusive 
evidence, is the basis upon which a search warrant may be issued. 
When the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of probable cause 
in State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (1971), it stated: 
[I]t is not necessary that the affiant have 
certain knowledge of the commission of crime 
or of the location of evidence incident 
thereto. It is only required that there be 
sufficient knowledge of the probability 
thereof that a person of reason and prudence 
would act thereon. 
2 
In footnote 1 of appellant's brief he states that the Utah 
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to give broader 
protection under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
However, since appellant has not provided any argument for a 
different analysis of this issue under the state constitutional 
provision, this Court should also only address the issue under 
the federal constitutional provision. See State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988); State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 70 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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490 P.2d at 337. Subsequently, the Court has said, "probability, 
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard 
of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1977). See also United States v. 
Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable cause for a 
search warrant is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the 
evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the 
policeman's affidavit."). More recently, in State v. Anderton, 
668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
totality-of-the-circumstance analysis espoused by the United 
States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
In addressing the sufficiency of a probable cause finding, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 
to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place. And the duty of a 
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . 
concluding]" that probable cause existed. 
462 U.S. at 238-239 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 271 (I960)). Based on the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit in question, the issuing magistrate in the present case 
could and did make a probable cause determination with a 
substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing. This is all that the fourth amendment 
requires. Gates, 462 U.S. at 237. 
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In the case at bar, the affiant had information 
obtained from an informant, dating as far back as November of 
1987, that defendant was involved in the sale of pound quantities 
of marijuana and hallucinogens (R. at 18). Defendant contends 
that this information was stale and therefore did not establish 
probable cause. This argument may have had merit if the 1987 
information was all that the affidavit contained. However, the 
affidavit contained additional information including that another 
individual had been in defendant's residence two weeks prior to 
the writing of the affidavit and had seen defendant with nine 
ounces of cocaine. In addition, four other informants had told 
officers of defendant's involvement in drug distribution. As 
recently as eight days prior to the affidavit, one of the four 
informants had been in defendant's house and had observed drug 
paraphernalia and marijuana. Also, the affiant had been present 
the day of the affidavit when defendant made arrangements to sell 
cocaine to an informant. The affiant had also seen defendant 
throw baggies of cocaine from his vehicle during a high speed 
chase (R. at 17-18). This information, taken as a whole, 
demonstrated that defendant's drug involvement had been ongoing. 
The continuous nature of the drug activity made the passage of 
time less important to the affidavit. As the Tenth Circuit Court 
said in United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972): 
[W]here the affidavit properly recites facts 
indicating activity of a protracted and 
continuous nature, a course of conduct, the 
passage of time becomes less significant. 
461 F.2d at 287. In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] mere passage of time does 
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not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant." 
732 P.2d at 131. The 1987 activity, together with the activity 
occurring up to the date of the search in the present case, 
established a course of conduct and a continuing nature of 
defendant's drug involvement. Thus, when taken in conjunction 
with more recent evidence, the 1987 activity legitimately 
contributed to establishing probable cause. 
As recently as two weeks prior to the issuance of the 
warrant, an individual, who will be called Informant I for 
clarity, observed nine ounces of cocaine at defendant's residence 
and purchased one ounce of cocaine on that same day (R. at 17). 
Defendant asserts the credibility and reliability of this 
informant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Case law 
does not require that credibility and reliability be proven to a 
certainty, but instead, requires that the affidavit be reviewed 
under the totality-of-the-circumstances test adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Anderton. In United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 
957 (8th Cir. 1986), the court stated: 
Our touchstone is "probability," and not 
"certainty," and one-hundred-percent 
reliability on the part of [the informants] 
was not crucial to issuance of the warrant. 
793 F.2d at 963. In the Anderton case, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's finding of probable cause for a search 
warrant. On the issue of informant reliability, the court said: 
Resad as a whole, and in a common-sense way, 
the affidavit sets forth sufficient 
underlying circumstances to support the 
conclusions reached by the affiant and to 
support the reliability and credibility of 
the informant. 
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668 P.2d at 1260 (footnote omitted). Because Informant I's 
assertions were verified by substantial independent proof of 
defendant's drug trafficking involvement, under the totality-of-
the-circumstances standard, there was sufficient information for 
the issuing magistrate to make a common sense determination that 
the information was reliable. See State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1362, 1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
On January 23, 1989, an individual who will be called 
Informant II observed narcotic paraphernalia and small quantities 
of marijuana at defendant's residence. On that same occasion, 
defendant told Informant II that defendant would be receiving 
additional quantities of controlled substances, including 
marijuana, in the next few days (R. at 17-18). Defendant asserts 
that this information was not sufficient to establish probable 
cause. Defendant cites State v. Adkins, 346 S.E.2d 762 (W.Va. 
1986), to support his assertion. In Adkins, the court said: 
The factual basis for the affidavit in 
[Adkins] was solely based on an undisclosed 
confidential informant whose only fact 
statement as reported by the officer making 
the affidavit was that he had observed 
marijuana inside the . . . structure and in 
the controll (sic) of [defendant]. 
346 S.E.2d at 774. The case at bar is clearly distinguishable 
from Adkins. Unlike the affidavit in Adkins, the affidavit in 
the case at bar is not conclusory. Nor is the information 
relating to the presence of controlled substances at defendant's 
residence based solely on the opinion of the affiant. There was 
reliable and corroborating information from a number of 
informants, at least one of whom had been involved in prior 
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narcotics transactions resulting in the arrest and conviction of 
over 20 persons (R. at 18). Further, on February 1, 1989, the 
day the search warrant was executed, the affiant was present 
during recorded communication between defendant and an individual 
who will be called Informant III, wherein defendant agreed to 
provide a one ounce quantity of cocaine to the informant. The 
affiant had information that the communication was initiated by a 
telephone call to defendant's residence (R. at 18). Following 
the drug transaction arranged between Informant III and defendant 
was a high speed chase wherein the affiant observed baggies being 
thrown out of the t™-'"1 driven b^ r deferd^^t '*>. at 18). 
Subsequently, the informant who was in defendant's truck during 
the chase told the affiant that defendant had had cocaine but had 
thrown it out the window (R. at 18). 
Based on these facts, it vcvl- be unreasonable to 
conclude that the affidavit was so conclusory as to render it a 
"bare bones" affidavit like that condemned by the Adkins court. 
Instead, common sense dictates that the information contained in 
the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause. 
Defendant also contends that because the sale of one 
ounce of cocaine to Informant III on February 1, 1989 was to take 
place in defendant's vehicle, there was not probable cause for 
issuing a search warrant to search his residence. However, Tapp 
makes clear that the standard is probability, not certain 
knowledge. Under the circumstances, the affiant had a reasonable 
belief that drugs and drug paraphernalia would be located at 
defendant's residence. Because a reasonable, prudent person 
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would act on such a suspicion, probable cause for issuing a 
search warrant was established and defendant's fourth amendment 
rights were not infringed upon. 
POINT IV 
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY PERFORMED HIS 
FUNCTION AS A NEUTRAL AND DETACHED JUDGE IN 
APPROVING THE WARRANT IN THIS CASE. 
As discussed in Point III, under the totality of the 
circumstances analysis, the police officer-affiant presented 
sufficient facts in his affidavit upon which the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing. The Court in United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984), stated: 
It is the magistrate's responsibility to 
determine whether the officer's allegations 
establish probable cause and, if so, to issue 
a warrant comporting in form with the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
468 U.S. at 921. Defendant contends that the magistrate in the 
case at bar abandoned his neutral role and became an ally of the 
police and simply "rubber stamped" the affiant's statement. This 
argument fails because, as previously discussed, the affiant's 
statements established probable cause. The affidavit was not 
conclusory, but was based on independent facts derived from 
reliable and corroborating information from a number of 
informants, as well as the personal observations of the affiant. 
Therefore, the magistrate could and did make a common sense 
determination that 
given all the circumstance set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the 
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
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[was] a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime [would] be found in a 
particular place. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
Since the affidavit in this case established probable 
cause, the magistrate did not act as a rubber stamp in signing 
the warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J?"' '"'" day of March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
residence located at 
181 Cushing Way 
Layton, Utah 
occupied by Robert Dyer 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS: 
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by 
Lon Brian, investigator with the Davis Metro Narcotic Strike 
Force, that he has reason to believe that in the below-described 
premises there are items which constitute evidence of the 
commission of a crime. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime or night time to 
make immediate search of the premises described as: 
The residence located at 
181 Cushing Way 
Layton, Utah 
Occupied by Robert Dyer 
and search for the following property: 
Controlled Substances 
Razor blades, mirrors, and plastic or metal 
tubes used to ingest controlled substances. 
Other types of drug paraphernalia used to ingest 
or facilitate the sale of controlled substances. 
Records, account books, or other forms of recorded 
narcotics trafficking. 
Pictures, receipts, personal property or other 
items evidencing ownership, occupation or 
control of the above premises of rooms therein. 
And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or 
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this 
Court. . / / _ ••^••^i>--T ^,-^, ^-C ^ ^ - ^ ^ X^ "-;> c : . 
•w«,'U ^  GiVen under my hand ana dated this lsf day of
 r. y . 
February, 1989. 
> 
1/ (Uy^ -t-^ -^ --^  
Circuit Court Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84 025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
residence located at 
181 Cushing Way 
Layton, Utah 
occupied by Robert Dyer 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before the honorable K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge, 
the undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that 
he has probable cause to believe that on the premises which are 
described as: 
The residence located at 
181 Cushing Way 
Layton, Utah 
Occupied by Robert Dyer 
there is now certain property described as: 
Controlled Substances 
Razor blades, mirrors, and plastic or metal 
tubes used to ingest controlled substances. 
Other types of drug paraphernalia used to ingest 
or facilitate the sale of controlled 
substances. 
Records, account books, or other forms of recorded 
narcotics trafficking. 
Pictures, receipts, personal property or other 
items evidencing ownership, occupation or 
control of the above premises or rooms therein. 
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are as 
follows: 
1. That the affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force and is familiar with the facts presented 
herein. 
2. Affiant received information from Richard Bliss, an 
officer with Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force that a 
confidential informant told him approximately two weeks ago that 
Robert Dyer had in his residence at 181 Cushing Way, Layton, 
Utah, approximately nine ounces of cocaine, one of which the 
informant purchased. 
3. Affiant has received information in the past from four 
other informants that Mr. Dyer was trafficking in controlled 
substances. 
4. Affiant on January 23, 1989, had one of the four 
informants in Mr. Dyer's residence where narcotic paraphernalia 
and small quantities of marijuana were observed. The informant 
further indicated that Mr. Dyer told him that he would be 
obtaining additional controlled substances, specifically 
marijuana, in the next few days. 
5. Affiant further had information from a third informant 
in November of 1987 that the informant had been purchasing pound 
quantities of marijuana and hallucinogenics from Mr. Dyer. 
6. On February 1, 1989, affiant was present during recorded 
communication between an informant and Mr. Robert Dyer wherein 
Mr. Dyer agreed to provide a one ounce quantity of cocaine to the 
informant. The informant was given instructions to contact Mr. 
Dyer from a payphone on SR 193 and Fairfield in Layton. Affiant 
was informed by Officer Bliss that the initial contact with Mr. 
Dyer had been by telephone to Mr. Dyer's residence. 
7. The informant then indicated that he was to meet Dyer at 
another location and officers of the Davis Metro Narotics Strike 
Force observed the informant inside a white truck being driven by-
Mr. Dyer. 
8. After the observations, affiant engaged in a high speed 
chase and observed baggies being thrown out of the truck. The 
truck was finally stopped and affiant spoke with the informant 
who stated that Mr. Dyer had the cocaine but threw it out of the 
window. 
9. Affiant believes that the informant that was in the 
residence on January 23 is reliable as he has been involved in 
prior narcotics transactions that have resulted in the arrest and 
conviction of over 20 persons. 
10. Based on affiant's experience and training as a 
narcotics officer, a drug dealer will often keep records and 
accounts of their transactions, and proceeds of their dealings 
will appear in sales receipts and bank records. These same 
receipts and bank records show ownership and occupancy of 
the residence and its contents. 
8. Based on affiant's experience and training as a 
narcotics officer during the last three years it is often the 
case that a drug dealer or user 
will keep miscellaneous paraphernalia to facilitate their use of 
narcotics, and the dispensing of them. The dealer will also keep 
records of drug transactions and evidence of ownership or 
residency of the premises within the residence itself. 
9. Affiant believes from the foregoing that there is 
probable cause to believe that there are controlled substances 
and other items as identified herein within the above mentioned 
residence. Affiant further knows that the residence will need to 
be searched during the nighttime as Mr. Dyer has been arrested 
and may contact someone to eliminate any controlled substances 
that may be within the residence. Affiant is further aware that 
controlled substances may be easily destroyed and concealed and 
that dealers in controlled substances often maintain weapons at 
their residence for use in protecting themselves and their 
controlled substances and therefore requests authorization for 
entry of the residence without announcing the officer's purpose 
or identity. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above described premises and the seizure 
of any of the said items and that the same be authorized for 
issuance in the nighttime without notice of purpose or authority 
~ ^ 
1989. 
Subscribed and sworn to me this 1st day of February, 
/ 
<_ 
jM 
Circuit Co ufrt Judc 
D 
ge 
ADDENDUM C 
FSLT 
f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT lJ ' •' c 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
- ~ - ^ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
Plaintiff, 
: TO SUPPRESS 
vs. 
ROBERT A. DYER, : Case No. 6378 fi^io) 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above-entitled court and the court having 
reviewed that portion of the transcript referred to by counsel 
and having reviewed the affidavit and search warrant and 
memorandum submitted by counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises hereby rules as follows. 
In the first instance, the court recognizes that the 
traditional test of Aguilar and Spinelli, which set out a two 
prong test which had to be met to establish the reliability of an 
informant as a basis for a search warrant, has now been abandoned 
by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah. Spinelli vs. The United States 393 US 410, 21 L Ed 2d 
637 (1969), Aguilar vs. Texas 378 US 108, 12 L ed 2d 723 (1964); 
Illinois vs. Gates 462 US 213 (1983); The State of Utah vs. 
Anderton Utah , 668 Pacific 2nd 1258 (1983). 
The hypertechnical requirements of the Spinelli and 
Aguilar have now given way to a common sense interpretation based 
on a totality of the circumstances. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gates Supra it states 
sitsuccinctly when it held: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sensed decision whether, given all of the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the "voracity and basis of knowledge" of the 
person supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that the contraband or evidence of crime in a 
particular place. 
Our own Supreme Court in discussing the common-sense 
approach stated in the Anderton case quoting from Spinelli: 
That probability and not prima facia showing 
a criminal activity is the standard of probable 
cause in judging probable cause issuing 
magistrates are not to be confused by niggardly 
limitations or by restriction of the use of their 
common sense, and their determination of probable 
cause should be paid great deference by the 
reviewing courts. 
In reviewing the affidavit in support of the warrant 
herein questioned, the warrant contained the following 
information. 
The affiant had received information from four 
different informants that defendant was trafficking in controlled 
substance. 
Affiant was informed by a particular informant that he 
had purchased pound quantities of marijuana and hallucinogens 
from defendant in 1987. 
Detective Bliss, an associate of the affiant's on the 
task force, reported that one of his informants had told him that 
he had been in the Dyer home at 181 Cushing Way in Layton 
approximately two weeks prior to the date of the affidavit and 
that defendant had in his possession nine ounces of cocaine at 
the residence and that the informant had purchased one of the 
ounces. 
That one of the four informants had told the affiant 
that he was in defendant's residence on January 23, 1989 and had 
observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia. That the defendant 
had represented that he expected to receive additional controlled 
substance specifically marijuana within the next few days. 
That said confidential informant had previously been 
involved in the arrest and conviction of over 20 persons involved 
in drug transactions. 
That the affiant was present on February 1, 1989, the 
date of the search warrant, and recorded a conversation between 
the informant and the defendant wherein defendant agreed to 
provide one ounce of cocaine to the informant. 
The defendant instructed the informant to go to a 
certain pay phone to call the defendant. 
The informant advised the affiant that he was required 
to meet the defendant at another location. 
The affiant observed informant in a truck driven by the 
defendant. 
A high-speed chase ensued with the affiant pursuing. 
Affiant observed baggies being thrown out of the truck. The 
truck was eventually stopped. Informant informed the affiant 
that defendant had the cocaine but threw it out the window during 
the chase. 
Affiant was an experienced officer working on the drug 
task force, was experienced with the drug scene and the manner of 
doing business therein. 
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was aware 
that drug dealers often keep accounts of transactions, proceeds 
from deals, and bank records at their place of residence. 
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was also 
aware that drug dealers often keep drug paraphernalia at their 
residence to facilitate the use and dispensing of controlled 
substances. 
Affiant was informed by a fellow officer, Detective 
Bliss, that the initial contact with the defendant had been by 
telephone at his residence. 
With the foregoing facts, this court concludes that 
from all of the information set forth in the affidavit taken from 
a common sense point of view there was a fair probability that 
defendant resided in the residence in question and that 
controlled substance, paraphernalia, and records of drug 
trafficking would be found therein. 
Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the 
affidavit in question was inadequate to support the warrant, the 
court concludes that evidence obtained in the case would be 
admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
as set forth in U.S. vs. Leon 468 US 897, 82 L ed 2nd 677 
(1984). 
The Leon Court recognized a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and in so doing ruled that inherently 
trustworthy, tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate may be 
admitted even though said warrant is ultimately found to be 
defective. 
In so doing the Leon Court recognized that the 
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safe 
guard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. It 
was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish 
errors of judges and magistrates. 
The court went on the say that suppression of evidence 
obtained pursuant to a defective warrant should only be ordered 
on a case by case basis and only in the unusual case in which the 
exclusion would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
As that court stated, there is no deterrent effect 
where the offending officers acted in an objectively reasonable 
belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
L I 
In discussing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary 
rule, the court indicated that the rule assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful or at least negligent conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right; where the official action 
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrent 
rational loses much of its force. 
In the matter here before the Court, the warrant was 
properly executed, the officer searched only those places and for 
those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by 
the warrant. 
The record and the evidence is devoid of any indication 
that the affiant misled by information that affiant knew was 
false or would have known was false except for his reckless 
disregard of truth; or that the magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role, or that the warrant was based on an affidavit so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. 
This court believes that the officers in this case 
acted with objective, good faith in obtaining the warrant and 
acted reasonably within the scope thereof and that, therefore, 
even assuming that the affidavit was defective to exclude the 
evidence so obtained would not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any manner, but would only tend to make the 
officers less willing to do their job in the future. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion to 
suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2£>^ day of August, A.D., 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
,/^wi 
Cotart Judg^ District b g 
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